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Abstract
We pose and study a fundamental algorithmic problem which we term mixture selection,
arising as a building block in a number of game-theoretic applications: Given a function g
from the n-dimensional hypercube to the bounded interval [−1, 1], and an n × m matrix A
with bounded entries, maximize g(Ax) over x in the m-dimensional simplex. This problem
arises naturally when one seeks to design a lottery over items for sale in an auction, or craft
the posterior beliefs for agents in a Bayesian game through the provision of information (a.k.a.
signaling).
We present an approximation algorithm for this problem when g simultaneously satisfies two
“smoothness” properties: Lipschitz continuity with respect to the L∞ norm, and noise stability.
The latter notion, which we define and cater to our setting, controls the degree to which low-
probability — and possibly correlated — errors in the inputs of g can impact its output. The
approximation guarantee of our algorithm degrades gracefully as a function of the Lipschitz
continuity and noise stability of g. In particular, when g is both O(1)-Lipschitz continuous and
O(1)-stable, we obtain an (additive) polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for mixture
selection. We also show that neither assumption suffices by itself for an additive PTAS, and
both assumptions together do not suffice for an additive fully polynomial-time approximation
scheme (FPTAS).
We apply our algorithm for mixture selection to a number of different game-theoretic ap-
plications, focusing on problems from mechanism design and optimal signaling. In particular,
we make progress on a number of open problems suggested in prior work by easily reducing
them to mixture selection: we resolve an important special case of the small-menu lottery
design problem posed by Dughmi, Han, and Nisan [DHN14]; we resolve the problem of revenue-
maximizing signaling in Bayesian second-price auctions posed by Emek et al. [EFG+12] and
Miltersen and Sheffet [BMS12]; we design a quasipolynomial-time approximation scheme for the
optimal signaling problem in normal form games suggested by Dughmi [Dug14]; and we design
an approximation algorithm for the optimal signaling problem in the voting model of Alonso
and Caˆmara [AC14].
∗This work was supported by NSF grants CCF-1350900, CCF-1423618, CCF-0964481, CCF-1111270, and the last
author’s Simons Investigator Award from the Simons Foundation.
†University of Southern California, {yu.cheng.1, hoyeeche, shaddin, emamjome, li.han, shanghua}@usc.edu.
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1 Introduction
Lotteries, beliefs, mixed strategies — all are distributions arising as important objects in game
theory. It is unsurprising, therefore, that algorithmic game theory is rife with algorithmic problems
which — implicitly or explicitly — optimize over the space of distributions, or equivalently the
simplex. In this paper, we identify a family of algorithmic problems over the simplex which arise
over and over in game theory. We term problems in this class mixture selection, and examine their
computational complexity.
Given a function g from the solid n-dimensional hypercube to the bounded interval [−1, 1], and
an integer m, we define the m-dimensional mixture selection problem for g as follows. The input to
this problem is an n×m matrix A with bounded entries, and the objective is to compute x ∈ ∆m
maximizing g(Ax). It is natural to expect that the computational complexity of mixture selection
depends crucially on the “complexity” of the function g. We therefore identify two “smoothness”
parameters of the function g which control the extent to which mixture selection is tractable, and
derive a simple approximation algorithm with guarantees degrading gracefully in those parameters.
Moreover, we present evidence — in the form of hardness results — that smoothness in both senses
is necessary for the kind of general results we obtain.
The first smoothness quantity is a familiar one, namely Lipschitz continuity in the L∞ metric.
The second quantity, which we define and term noise stability, borrows ideas from related definitions
of stability in other contexts (e.g. [KKL88, MOO10]), though is importantly different. Informally,
a function g from the solid n-dimensional hypercube to the real numbers is β-noise stable (or β-
stable for short) if the random corruption of an α-fraction of the n inputs to g, with no individual
input disproportionately likely to be corrupted, does not decrease the output of g by more than
αβ. We note that a Fourier-analytic notion of stability is closely-related to ours — we elaborate
on this connection in Section 9.
This paper lays out a framework for tackling mixture selection problems, and presents a number
of applications in mechanism design and optimal signaling in games. Notably, we find that we
resolve or make progress on a number of known open problems, and some new ones, using our
framework.
Our Results
Our results for mixture selection can be viewed as generalizing the main insights of Lipton et
al. [LMM03]. First, we show that when g is noise stable and Lipschitz continuous, and x ∈ ∆m
is arbitrary, there is a sparse vector x˜ for which g(Ax˜) is not much smaller than g(Ax). The
proof of this fact proceeds by sampling from x and letting x˜ be the empirical distribution, as in
[LMM03]. However, when g is sufficiently noise stable and Lipschitz continuous, we obtain a better
tradeoff between the number of samples required and the error introduced into the objective than
does [LMM03], and this is crucial for our applications. Our analysis bounds the expected difference
between g(Ax) and g(Ax˜) as the sum of two terms: The first term represents the error in the output
of g caused by the low-probability “large errors” in its n inputs, and the second term represents the
error in the output of g introduced by the higher-probability “small errors” in its n inputs. The
first term is bounded using noise stability, and the second is bounded using Lipschitz continuity.
Second, we instantiate the above insight algorithmically, as does [LMM03]. Specifically, our
algorithm enumerates vectors x˜ of the desired sparsity in order to find an approximately optimal
solution to our mixture selection problem. We note that our guarantees are all parametrized by
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the Lipschitz continuity c and the noise stability β of the function g. Most notably, we obtain an
additive polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) whenever both β and c are constants.
Third, we rule out certain natural extensions of our results assuming well-believed complexity-
theoretic conjectures. We show that neither Lipschitz continuity nor noise stability alone suffices
for an additive PTAS for mixture selection, and both together do not suffice for an additive fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS). For a function which is O(1)-stable yet O(1)-
Lipschitz continuous only in the L1 metric, we show approximation hardness by a reduction from
the NP-hard maximum independent set problem. For a function which is O(1)-Lipschitz in L∞ yet
not O(1)-stable, we show approximation hardness by a reduction from the planted clique problem.
Finally, for a function which is both O(1)-Lipschitz in L∞ and O(1)-stable, we rule out an additive
FPTAS via a reduction from the maximum independent set problem.
Despite the simplicity of our framework, we find that it has powerful implications for problems
in mechanism design and optimal signaling in games. We feature four natural applications in this
paper, three of which resolve or partially resolve outstanding open problems from prior work:
1. Lottery design: Dughmi, Han, and Nisan [DHN14] examined one of the most basic problems
in mechanism design: that of designing the revenue-maximizing multi-item auction for a single
unit-demand buyer with valuation represented implicitly via a sampling oracle. They reduced
this problem to a regularized variant of itself, namely optimally designing a small number
of lottery-price pairs — a small menu — from which the buyer is allowed to choose. We
apply our framework to resolve the special case of this problem with a single lottery — i.e., a
menu of size 1. This follows from the Lipschitz continuity and noise stability of the function
g
(lottery)
w (t) := max
p
{p ·∑ni=1wi · I[ti ≥ p]} for an arbitrary weight vector w ∈ ∆n, where I[E ]
is the indicator function for the event E .
2. Revenue-maximizing signaling in probabilistic second-price auctions: Emek et
al. [EFG+12] and Miltersen and Sheffet [BMS12] considered signaling in the context of a
probabilistic second-price auction. In particular, the attributes of the item for sale are un-
known, and the auctioneer must decide what information to reveal in order to maximize his
revenue in this auction. This is particularly relevant in advertising auctions, where items
are impressions associated with demographics that are a-priori unknown to the advertisers
bidding in the auction. Whereas both papers presented a polynomial-time algorithm for this
problem when bidder types are fixed, the general problem was shown to be NP-hard and its
approximability was left largely open. Using our framework, a PTAS for the general problem
follows easily. We use the fact that the function max2, which simply returns the second
largest entry of a vector, is Lipschitz continuous and noise stable.
3. Persuasion in voting: Alonso and Caˆmara [AC14] examine a simple election for selecting
a binary outcome — say whether a ballot measure is passed — when voters are not fully
informed of the consequences of the measure, and hence of their utilities. Each voter casts a
Yes/No vote, and the measure passes if the fraction of Yes votes exceeds a certain pre-specified
threshold. A principal — say a moderator of a political debate — can determine the protocol
— or signaling scheme — through which information regarding the measure is gathered and
shared with voters. We consider a principal concerned with maximizing the probability of
the measure passing. [AC14] characterize the optimal signaling scheme and a number of its
properties, though stop short of deriving an algorithm for optimal signaling. We design a
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multi-criteria PTAS for this problem using our framework. Along the way, we also design a
bi-criteria PTAS for the related problem of maximizing the expected number of Yes votes in
the election. For both results, we use the fact that the function g(vote-sum)(t) = 1n | {i : ti ≥ 0} |
is noise stable and Lipschitz continuous in a bi-criteria sense.
4. Optimal signaling in normal form games: Dughmi [Dug14] examined the problem of
optimal signaling in abstract normal form games, and ruled out an FPTAS even for two-
player zero-sum games. The possibility for a PTAS for two-player zero-sum games, and a
QPTAS for general games with a constant number of players, were left open. We show that
a bi-criteria QPTAS for normal-form games with a constant number of players follows from
our framework, and applies to a large and natural class of objective functions. We use the
fact that every function is O(n)-stable, and the fact that the function measuring the quality
of equilibria satisfies a bi-criteria notion of Lipschitz continuity which we define.
Additional Discussion of Related Work
As previously described, our framework generalizes and refines the main insight of [LMM03]. The
recent work of Barman [Bar15] is also similar in spirit; in particular, the approximate variant of
Caratheodory’s theorem employed in that paper can be viewed as a mixture selection problem with
g(Ax) = −||Ax−Ax∗||p for a fixed vector x∗ and norm p ≥ 2. Even though this function g is neither
Lipschitz continuous in L∞ nor noise stable, Barman exhibits a PTAS under the assumption that
the columns of A have small (i.e. constant) p-norm.
2 Framework
For a function g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] and a positive integer m, we define the following optimization
problem which we termm-dimensionalmixture selection for g: given an n×mmatrix A with entries
in [−1, 1], find x in the m-dimensional simplex ∆m maximizing f(x) := g(Ax). In this section, we
present our notion of noise stability, and derive approximation algorithms for this problem when the
function g is simultaneously noise stable and Lipschitz continuous with respect to the L∞ metric.
Moreover, we show that neither requirement alone suffices for our results.
Our approximation guarantees will be additive — i.e., an ǫ-approximation algorithm for mixture
selection outputs x ∈ ∆m with f(x) ≥ maxy∈∆m f(y)− ǫ. To illustrate our techniques, we use the
following function g(mid) : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1], which averages all but the top and bottom quartiles
of its inputs, as a running example.
g(mid)(t) =
1
⌈3n/4⌉ − ⌊n/4⌋
⌈3n/4⌉∑
i=⌊n/4⌋+1
t[i],
where t[i] denote the i
th largest entry of t. Throughout the paper, we use ti to denote the i
th entry
of t, and use t[i] to denote the i
th largest entry of t.
Though we present our framework for functions g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1], we define mixture
selection similarly for functions g : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]. The two definitions are equivalent up to
normalization, and it is easy to verify that all our results and bounds for mixture selection carry
through unchanged to either definition.
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Our main result applies to functions g which are both noise stable and Lipschitz continuous
with respect to the L∞ metric. We now formalize these two conditions.
Lipschitz Continuity
A function g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] is c-Lipschitz continuous in L∞ — or c-Lipschitz for short — if
and only if for all t, t′ in the domain of g, |g(t) − g(t′)| ≤ c||t− t′||∞. To illustrate, our example
function g(mid) is 1-Lipschitz. We note that Lipschitz continuity in L∞ is a stronger assumption
than in any other Lp norm.
Noise Stability
Our notion of noise stability captures the following desirable property of a function g : [−1, 1]n →
[−1, 1]: if a random process corrupts (i.e., modifies arbitrarily) some of the inputs to g, with no
individual input disproportionately likely to be corrupted, then the output of g does not decrease
by much in expectation. Such random corruption patterns are captured by our notion of a light
distribution over subsets of [n], defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Light Distribution). Let D be a distribution supported on subsets of [n]. For
α ∈ (0, 1], we say D is α-Light if and only if the following holds for all i ∈ [n]: PrR∼D[i ∈ R] ≤ α.
In other words, a light distribution bounds the marginal probability of any individual element
of [n]. When corrupted inputs follow a light distribution, no individual input is too likely to be
corrupted. However, we note that our notion of light distribution allows arbitrary correlations
between the corruption events of various inputs. We define a noise stable function as one which
is robust, in an average sense, to corrupting a subset R of its n inputs when R follows a light
distribution D. Our notion of robustness is one-sided: we only require that our function’s output
not decrease substantially in expectation. This one-sided guarantee suffices for all our applications,
and is necessitated by some. We note that the light distribution D, as well as the (corrupted)
inputs, are chosen adversarially. We make use of the following notation in our definition: Given
vectors t, t′ ∈ [−1, 1]n and a set R ⊆ [n], we say t′ ≈
R
t if ti = t
′
i for all i 6∈ R. In other words, if
t′ ≈
R
t, then t′ is a result of corrupting the entries of t corresponding to R.
Definition 2.2 (Noise Stability). Given a function g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] and a real number β ≥ 0,
we say g is β-stable if and only if the following holds for all t ∈ [−1, 1]n, α ∈ (0, 1], and α-Light
distributions D over subsets of [n]:
E
R∼D
[
min{g(t′) : t′ ≈
R
t}
]
≥ g(t)− αβ.
To illustrate this definition, we show that our example function g(mid) is 4-stable. To see this,
observe that changing k entries of the input to g(mid) can decrease its output by at most 4kn . When
R is drawn from an α-Light distribution and t is an arbitrary input, 4-stability therefore follows
from the linearity of expectations:
E
R∼D
[
min{g(mid)(t′) : t′ ≈
R
t}
]
≥ E
R∼D
[
g(mid)(t)− 4|R|
n
]
≥ g(mid)(t)− 4α.
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We note that every function g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] is 2n-stable, which follows from the union bound.
As a useful building block for proving some of our functions stable, we show that stable functions
can be combined to yield other stable functions if composed with a convex, nondecreasing, and
Lipschitz continuous function.
Proposition 2.3. Fix β, c ≥ 0, and let g1, g2, . . . , gk : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] be β-stable functions. For
every convex function h : [−1, 1]k → [−1, 1] which is nondecreasing in each of its arguments and
c-Lipschitz continuous in L∞, the function g(t) := h(g1(t), . . . , gk(t)) is (βc)-stable.
Proof. For all t ∈ [−1, 1]n and all α-Light distributions D,
E
R∼D
[min
t′≈
R
t
g(t′)] = E
R∼D
[min
t′≈
R
t
h(g1(t
′), . . . , gk(t
′))]
≥ E
R∼D
[h(min
t′≈
R
t
g1(t
′), . . . ,min
t′≈
R
t
gk(t
′))] (Since h is nondecreasing)
≥ h( E
R∼D
[min
t′≈
R
t
g1(t
′)], . . . , E
R∼D
[min
t′≈
R
t
gk(t
′)]) (Jensen’s inequality)
≥ h(g1(t)− αβ, . . . , gk(t)− αβ) (Stability of each gi)
≥ h(g1(t), . . . , gk(t))− αβc (Lipschitz continuity of h)
= g(t) − αβc.
As a consequence of the above proposition, a convex combination of β-stable functions is β-stable,
and the point-wise maximum of β-stable functions is β-stable.
Consequences of Noise Stability and Lipschitz Continuity
We now state the two main results of our framework. Both results apply to functions g : [−1, 1]n →
[−1, 1] which are simultaneously Lipschitz continuous and noise stable, and n×m matrices A with
entries in [−1, 1]. Given a vector x ∈ ∆m and integer s > 0, we view x as a probability distribution
over [m], and use the random variable x˜ ∈ ∆m to denote the empirical distribution of s i.i.d.
samples from x. Formally, x˜ = 1s
∑s
i=1 eki , where k1, . . . , ks ∈ [m] are drawn i.i.d. according to
x, and ej ∈ ∆m denotes the jth standard basis vector. Since x˜ is the average of s standard basis
vectors, we say it is s-uniform.
Definition 2.4. We refer to a distribution y ∈ ∆m as s-uniform if and only if it is the average of
a multiset of s standard basis vectors in m-dimensional space.
Our first result shows that when the number of samples s is chosen as a suitable function of
the Lipschitz continuity and noise stability parameters, g(Ax˜) is not much smaller than g(Ax) in
expectation over x˜. At a high level, we bound this difference as a sum of two error terms: one
accounts for the effect of low-probability large errors in the inputs t˜ = Ax˜ to g, and the other
accounts for effect of higher-probability small errors in the inputs t˜. The former error term is
bounded using noise stability, and the latter error term is bounded using Lipschitz continuity.
Theorem 2.5. Let g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] be β-stable and c-Lipschitz in L∞, let A be an n × m
matrix with entries in [−1, 1], let α, δ > 0, and let s ≥ 2 ln( 2α )/δ2 be an integer. Fix a vector
x ∈ ∆m, and let the random variable x˜ denote the empirical distribution of s i.i.d. samples from
probability distribution x. The following then holds: E[g(Ax˜))] ≥ g(Ax)− αβ − cδ.
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Proof. Denote t = Ax and t˜ = Ax˜. Note that t˜ is a random variable. Also note that ti and
t˜i can be viewed as the mean and empirical mean, respectively, of a distribution supported on
Ai,1, . . . , Ai,m ∈ [−1, 1]. We say the ith entry of t is approximately preserved if |ti − t˜i| ≤ δ, and
we say it is corrupted otherwise. Let R ⊆ [n] denote the set of corrupted entries. Hoeffding’s
inequality, and our choice of the number of samples s, imply that R follows an α-Light distribution.
Let t′ be such that (1) t′i = t˜i for i ∈ R, and (2) t′i = ti otherwise. Observe that t′ ≈
R
t, and
||t′ − t˜||∞ ≤ δ. We can now bound the expected difference between g(t) and g(t˜) as a sum of the
error introduced by corrupted entries and the error introduced by the approximately preserved
entries of t:
g(t)− E[g(t˜)] = E[g(t)− g(t′)] + E[g(t′)− g(t˜)] ≤ αβ + cδ.
Notice that if we fix the desired approximation error ǫ, the minimum required number of
samples s in Theorem 2.5 to guarantee that E[g(Ax˜))] ≥ g(Ax) − ǫ is obtained by minimizing
⌈2 ln( 2α)/δ2⌉ over α, δ > 0 satisfying αβ + δc ≤ ǫ. Therefore, the required number of samples
depends only on the error term ǫ, the noise stability parameter β, and the Lipschitz continuity
parameter c; in particular, it is independent of n and m.
As a corollary of Theorem 2.5, we derive the following algorithmic result.
Theorem 2.6. Let g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] be β-stable and c-Lipschitz, and let m > 0 be an inte-
ger. For every δ, α > 0, the m-dimensional mixture selection problem for g admits an (αβ + cδ)-
approximation algorithm in the additive sense, with runtime n ·mO(log(1/α)/δ2) ·T , where T denotes
the time needed to evaluate g on a single input.
Proof. Let s ≥ 2 ln(2/α)/δ2 be an integer. Our algorithm simply enumerates all s-uniform distri-
butions, and outputs the one maximizing g(Ax). This takes time n ·mO(s) · T . The approximation
guarantee follows from Theorem 2.5 and the probabilistic method.
As a consequence of Theorem 2.6, the mixture selection problem for g(mid) admits a polynomial-
time approximation scheme (PTAS) in the additive sense. The same holds for every function g
which is O(1)-stable and O(1)-Lipschitz continuous. Specifically, by setting α = ǫ2β and δ =
ǫ
2c , an
ǫ-approximation algorithm runs in time n ·mO(c2 log(β/ǫ)/ǫ2) ·T . Interestingly, neither noise stability
nor Lipschitz continuity alone suffices for such a PTAS, as we argue in the next subsection.
The Necessity of Both Noise Stability and Lipschitz Continuity
We now present evidence that both our assumptions — Noise stability and Lipschitz continuity —
appear necessary for general positive results along the lines of those in Theorem 2.6.
1. Stability alone is not sufficient. In Section 8.1, we define a function g(slope) : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]
which is 1-stable. Furthermore, g(slope) is O(1)-Lipschitz with respect to the L1 metric, which
is a weaker property than Lipschitz continuity with respect to L∞. We show in Theorem 8.4
that there is a polynomial-time reduction from the maximum independent set problem on
n-node graphs to the n-dimensional mixture selection for g(slope). Moreover, the reduction
precludes a polynomial-time ǫ-approximation algorithm in the additive sense for some con-
stant ǫ > 0.
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2. Lipschitz continuity alone is not sufficient. One might hope to prove NP-hardness of mixture
selection in the absence of stability. However, we are out of luck in this regard: since every
function g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] is 2n-stable, Theorem 2.6 implies a quasipolynomial-time
approximation scheme in the additive sense whenever g is O(1)-Lipschitz. Nevertheless, we
prove hardness of approximation assuming the planted clique conjecture ([Jer92] and [Kucˇ95]).
More specifically, in Section 8.2 we exhibit a reduction from the planted k-clique problem
to mixture selection for the 3-Lipschitz function g
(clique)
k (t) = t[k] − t[k+1] + t[n]. When k =
ω(log2 n) and A is the adjacency matrix of an n-node undirected graph G, we show that
maxx g
(clique)
k (Ax) ≈ 1 with high probability if G contains a k-clique, and maxx g(clique)k (Ax) ≈
1
2 with high probability if G is the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph G(n,
1
2 ).
A Bi-criteria Extension of the Framework
We have already showed that in the absence of Lipschitz continuity, one can not hope for a PTAS
in general. Motivated by two of our applications, namely Optimal signaling in normal form games
and Persuasion in voting, we extend our framework to the design of approximation algorithms
for mixture selection with a bi-criteria guarantee when the function in question is stable but not
Lipschitz continuous. We first define a (δ, ρ)-relaxation of a function.
Definition 2.7. Given two functions g, h : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] and parameters δ, ρ ≥ 0, we say h is
a (δ, ρ)-relaxation of g if for all t1, t2 ∈ [−1, 1]n with ||t1 − t2||∞ ≤ δ, h(t2) ≥ g(t1)− ρ.
In lieu of the Lipschitz continuity condition, we prove our bounds for a relaxation of the function.
Theorem 2.8. Let g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] be β-stable, let A be an n × m matrix with entries in
[−1, 1], let α > 0 and δ, ρ ≥ 0, and let s ≥ 2 ln( 2α)/δ2 be an integer. Fix a vector x ∈ ∆m, and let the
random variable x˜ denote the empirical distribution of s i.i.d. samples from probability distribution
x. The following then holds for any (δ, ρ)-relaxation h of g,
E[h(Ax˜))] ≥ g(Ax)− αβ − ρ.
Proof. Because the proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 2.5, we just mention the
necessary modifications. Again, let t = Ax, let t˜ = Ax˜, let R ⊆ [n] denote the set of corrupted
inputs, and let t′ be such that t′i = t˜i for i ∈ R and t′i = ti otherwise. Then
g(t)− E[h(t˜)] = E[g(t)− g(t′)] + E[g(t′)− h(t˜)]
≤ αβ + E[g(t′)− h(t˜)]
≤ αβ + ρ,
where the first inequality follows by noise stability of g, and the last inequality follows from the
fact that h is a (δ, ρ)-relaxation of g.
Having replaced Theorem 2.5 by Theorem 2.8, a similar computational result as Theorem 2.6
can be inferred in the bi-criteria sense.
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3 Lottery Design for Revenue Maximization
To illustrate the utility of our framework, we start with a simple but basic open problem in Bayesian
mechanism design posed by Dughmi, Han, and Nisan [DHN14]. An instance of the lottery design
problem is given by a valuation matrix A ∈ [0, 1]n×m and n non-negative weights w1, . . . , wn with∑n
i=1wi = 1. Here n denotes the number of buyer types, m denotes the number of items, and
w represents a probability distribution over types. Each 0 ≤ Ai,j ≤ 1 is the value of item j to a
buyer of type i. The goal is to design a single lottery-price pair (x, p), with x ∈ ∆m and p ≥ 0, so
that the expected revenue of the auction which offers the lottery x over items at price p to a buyer
with type drawn according to w is maximized. We assume the buyer is risk neutral, and therefore
accepts the offer precisely if his type i satisfies Aix ≥ p. Consequently, our goal is to choose (x, p)
maximizing p ·∑ni=1(wi · I[Aix ≥ p]), where I[E ] denotes the indicator function for the event E .
The lottery design problem is closely related to the general unit-demand single-buyer mechanism
design problem considered in [DHN14], where the buyer’s type is drawn from a common knowledge
prior distribution B given by a sampling oracle, and the buyer is to be presented with a menu
consisting of several lottery-price pairs from which to choose. [DHN14] frame this mechanism
design problem as a computational task of “learning” a good mechanism by sampling from B, and
use the size of the menu as a regularization constraint in order to prevent over-fitting the mechanism
to the sampled data. The problem of maximizing the expected revenue by using a menu of at most
a given size is the main algorithmic question in [DHN14], and its computational complexity is
left largely open. When constrained to a menu with a single lottery, the goal is to choose (x, p)
maximizing the expected revenue p · Pr
a∼B
[ax ≥ p].
Using our mixture selection framework, we first give an additive PTAS for the lottery design
problem when the value distribution B is given explicitly by the matrix A and weights w as described
above. We then extend our result to cases in which B can only be accessed through sampling,
using fairly standard uniform convergence arguments. In Section 8.3 (Theorem 8.9), we rule out
an additive FPTAS for this problem, and in doing so provide complexity-theoretic evidence that
our PTAS — for both lottery design in particular and mixture selection for stable and Lipschitz-
continuous functions more generally — is essentially the best we can hope for.
3.1 Lottery Design in the Explicit Input Model
Given the number of buyer types n and weights w ∈ ∆n, the lottery design problem is simply
mixture selection for the function g
(lottery)
w (t) : [0, 1]n → [0, 1], defined below.
g(lottery)w (t) = max
p≥0
{p ·
n∑
i=1
(wi · I[ti ≥ p])} (3.1)
As the first step to applying our framework, we show that g
(lottery)
w is noise stable. The high
level idea is the following: if a subset of the inputs to g
(lottery)
w is corrupted, then in the worst case
each such input exceeded the price p before corruption but not after corruption. This reduces the
output of g
(lottery)
w by at most the total weight of corrupted inputs. When corrupted inputs are
chosen according to an α-Light distribution, their expected total weight is bounded by α.
Lemma 3.1. The function g
(lottery)
w is 1-stable.
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Proof. Let t ∈ [0, 1]n be an arbitrary input to g(lottery)w . When t′ is obtained from t by corrupting the
entries corresponding to R ⊆ [n], an event we denote by t′ ≈
R
t, it is easy to see that g
(lottery)
w (t′) ≥
g
(lottery)
w (t)−w(R) where w(R) =
∑
i∈R wi denotes the total weight of corrupted entries. Moreover,
when R is a random variable drawn from an α-Light distribution D, we can bound the expected
loss: E[w(R)] =
∑n
i=1 Pr[i ∈ R] · wi ≤
∑
i αwi = α. It follows that g
(lottery)
w is 1-stable.
E
R∼D
[
min{g(lottery)w (t′) : t′ ≈
R
t}
]
≥ g(lottery)w (t)− E
R∼D
[w(R)]
≥ g(lottery)w (t)− α.
Next, we prove Lipschitz continuity. The high-level idea is the following: if all inputs to g
(lottery)
w
decrease by δ, then we need only decrease the price p from expression (3.1) by δ. The (weighted)
fraction of inputs exceeding the price is at least the same as before.
Lemma 3.2. The function g
(lottery)
w is 1-Lipschitz continuous.
Proof. Consider t, t′ ∈ [0, 1]n with ||t′ − t||∞ ≤ δ. We prove that g(lottery)w (t′) ≥ g(lottery)w (t)− δ, and
by symmetry it follows that g
(lottery)
w (t) ≥ g(lottery)w (t′)−δ. Let p be the optimal price for t— i.e. the
maximizer of expression (3.1) — and define p′ = max{0, p−δ}. Whenever ti ≥ p we have t′i ≥ p′, and
therefore
n∑
i=1
(wi · I[t′i ≥ p′]) ≥
n∑
i=1
(wi · I[ti ≥ p]). It follows that g(lottery)w (t′) ≥ g(lottery)w (t)− δ.
Combining Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 with Theorem 2.6 yields an additive PTAS for lottery design.
Theorem 3.3. There is an additive PTAS for the lottery design problem when the valuation dis-
tribution is given explicitly by a matrix A ∈ [0, 1]n×m and a weight vector w ∈ ∆n.
3.2 Lottery Design in the Sample Oracle Model
So far, we have assumed that the buyer’s type distribution is given explicitly. We now show how to
extend our results to the sample oracle model. Specifically, we assume the buyer’s type a ∈ [0, 1]m
is drawn from a distribution B given by a sampling oracle, and seek a randomized approximation
scheme with runtime (and number of samples) polynomial in m for each desired approximation
guarantee ǫ. To simplify exposition we assume B has finite support, though our results hold more
generally. As usual, our goal is to choose a lottery x ∈ ∆m and a price p ≥ 0 to maximize
RevB(x, p) = p · Pr
a∼B
[ax ≥ p].
Theorem 3.4. There is an additive polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme (PRAS)
for the lottery design problem in the sample oracle model.
Proof. Recall that the PTAS in Theorem 3.3 optimizes over all s-uniform m-dimensional lotteries,
where s depends only on the desired approximation guarantee ǫ > 0, and is bounded by a polynomial
in 1ǫ . In particular, s is independent of the number of types n, implying that the same approach of
enumerating all s-uniform lotteries x˜ would succeed in the sample oracle model were it not for our
inability to evaluate maxpRevB(x˜, p) exactly.
We overcome this difficulty by Monte Carlo sampling from B. Given n types a1, . . . , an ∈ [0, 1]m
sampled from B and presented as the rows of a matrix A ∈ [0, 1]n×m, we run the PTAS from
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Theorem 3.3 with approximation parameter ǫ on the empirical distribution given by A and uniform
weights wi =
1
n for all i. Taking n to be a suitable polynomial in m,
1
ǫ , and log(
1
γ ) — where γ > 0
is a parameter — guarantees that |RevB(x˜, p) − p · 1n
∑n
i=1 I[Aix˜ ≥ p]| ≤ ǫ simultaneously for all
s-uniform lotteries x˜ and prices p with probability at least 1 − γ. This follows from standard tail
bounds and the union bound, coupled with a uniform convergence argument over prices p ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, with probability 1−γ our algorithm outputs a lottery-price pair whose expected revenue
for a buyer drawn from B is within O(ǫ) from the optimal.
4 Signaling
In the next few sections, we consider a number of Bayesian games in which a key parameter θ, the
state of nature, in part determines the payoff structure of the game. We use Θ to denote the set of
all states of nature, and assume θ ∈ Θ is drawn from a common-knowledge prior distribution which
we denote by λ. In all our applications, we assume players a-priori know nothing about θ other
than its prior distribution λ, and examine policies whereby a principal with access to the realized
value of θ may commit to a policy of revealing information to the players regarding θ. This is often
referred to as signaling (see e.g. [EFG+12, BMS12, DIR14, Dug14]). We restrict our attention to
symmetric signaling schemes, in which the principal must reveal the same information to all players
in the game. Thus, a symmetric signaling scheme is given by a set Σ of signals, and a (possibly
randomized) map ϕ from states of nature Θ to signals Σ. The goal of the principal, who is privy to
confidential state-of-nature information, is to boost her own objective by using a signaling scheme
ϕ that optimally affects the outcome of the game.
In this section, in addition to providing the technical background for signaling schemes, we use
our framework to define an abstract signaling problem and characterize its approximation complex-
ity. This abstract problem captures the essence of all signaling problems considered in this paper.
4.1 Background: Signaling Schemes
Letm = |Θ|. Abusing notation, we use ϕ(θ, σ) to denote the probability of announcing signal σ ∈ Σ
conditioned on the state of nature is θ ∈ Θ. It is well known ([KG09, Dug14]) that signaling schemes
are in one-to-one correspondence with convex decompositions of the prior distribution λ ∈ ∆m:
Formally, a signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ Σ corresponds to the convex decomposition λ =∑σ∈Σ νσ ·µσ ,
where (1) νσ = Prθ∼Θ[ϕ(θ) = σ] =
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)ϕ(θ, σ) is the probability of announcing signal σ, and
(2) µσ(θ) = Prθ∼Θ[θ|ϕ(θ) = σ] = λ(θ)ϕ(θ,σ)νσ is the posterior belief distribution of θ conditioned
on signal σ. The converse is also true: every convex decomposition of λ ∈ ∆m corresponds to a
signaling scheme. Alternatively, the reader can view a signaling scheme ϕ as the m× |Σ| matrix of
pairwise probabilities ϕ(θ, σ) satisfying conditions (1) and (2) with respect to λ ∈ ∆m.
Note that each posterior distribution µ ∈ ∆m defines a Bayesian game, and the principal’s
utility depends on the outcome of the game. Given a suitable equilibrium concept and selection
rule, we let f : ∆m → R denote the principal’s utility as a function of the posterior distribution µ.
For example, in an auction game f(µ) may be the social welfare or principal’s revenue at the
induced equilibrium, or any weighted combination of players’ utilities, or something else entirely.
The principal’s objective as a function of the signaling scheme ϕ can be mathematically expressed
by F (ϕ, λ) =
∑
σ νσ · f(µσ).
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In this setup, the optimal choice of a signaling scheme is related to the concave envelope f+ of the
function f ([KG09, Dug14]).1 Specifically, such a signaling scheme achieves
∑
σ νσ ·f(µσ) = f+(λ).
Thus, there exists a signaling scheme with m+ 1 signals that maximizes the principal’s objective,
by applying Caratheodory’s theorem to the hypograph of f .
4.2 An Abstract Signaling Problem and its Polynomial-Time Approximation
To connect to our mixture selection framework, we consider signaling problems in which the prin-
cipal’s utility f(µ) from a posterior distribution µ ∈ ∆m can be written as g(Aµ) for a function
g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] and a matrix A ∈ [−1, 1]n×m. As described in Section 4.1, a signaling
scheme ϕ with signals Σ corresponds to a family of probability-posterior pairs {(νσ, µσ)}σ∈Σ de-
composing the prior λ ∈ ∆m into a convex combination of posterior distributions (one per signal):
λ =
∑
σ∈Σ νσµσ. The objective of our signaling problem is then
F (ϕ) =
∑
σ∈Σ
νσf(µσ) =
∑
σ∈Σ
νσg(Aµσ).
We note that this signaling problem can alternatively be written as an (infinite-dimensional)
linear program which searches over probability measures supported on ∆m with expectation λ.
The separation oracle for the dual of this linear program is a mixture selection problem. Whereas
we do not use this infinite-dimensional formulation nor its dual directly, we nevertheless show that
the same conditions — noise stability and Lipschitz continuity — on the function g which lead to
an approximation scheme for mixture selection also lead to a similar approximation scheme for our
signaling problem with f(µ) = g(Aµ).
Lemma 4.1. If g is β-stable and c-Lipschitz, then for any constants α, δ > 0, and for any integer
s ≥ 2δ−2 ln(2/α), there exists a signaling scheme ϕ˜ for which every posterior distribution is s-
uniform, and F (ϕ˜) ≥ OPT − (αβ + cδ) where OPT denotes the value of the optimal signaling
scheme.
Proof. Let s ≥ 2δ−2 ln(2/α), and let τ ∈ [ms] index all s-uniform posteriors, with µ˜τ denoting the
τ ’th such posterior. For an arbitrary signaling scheme ϕ = (Σ, {(νσ , µσ)}σ∈Σ), we show that each
posterior µσ can be decomposed into s-uniform posteriors without degrading the objective by more
than αβ + cδ; more formally:
1. µσ can be expressed as a convex combination of s-uniform posteriors as follows.
µσ =
∑
τ∈[ms]
ν˜σ,τ µ˜τ with ν˜σ ∈ ∆ms . (4.1)
2. The value of objective function, i.e., g(Aµσ), is decreased by no more than αβ + cδ through
this decomposition, ∑
τ∈[ms]
ν˜σ,τ · g(Aµ˜τ ) ≥ g(Aµσ)− (αβ + cδ). (4.2)
1f+ is the point-wise lowest concave function h for which h(x) ≥ f(x) for all x in the domain. Equivalently, the
hypograph of f+ is the convex hull of the hypograph of f .
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The existence of such a decomposition follows from Theorem 2.5: Fix σ, and let µ˜ ∈ ∆m be the
empirical distribution of s i.i.d. samples from distribution µσ ∈ ∆m. The vector µ˜ is itself a
random variable supported on s-uniform posteriors, its expectation is µσ, and by Theorem 2.5 we
have E[g(Aµ˜)] ≥ g(Aµσ)− (αβ + cδ). Therefore, by taking ν˜σ,τ = Pr[µ˜ = µ˜τ ] for each τ ∈ [ms] we
get the desired decomposition of µσ.
The lemma follows by composing the decomposition ϕ with the decompositions of the posterior
beliefs µσ to yield a signaling scheme ϕ˜ with only s-uniform posteriors and F (ϕ˜) ≥ F (ϕ)−(αβ+cδ).
Specifically, the signals of ϕ˜ are Σ× [ms], where signal (σ, τ) has probability νσ · ν˜σ,τ and induces
the posterior µ˜τ .
2 Using Equation (4.1) and (4.2), it is easy to verify that this describes a valid
signaling scheme with F (ϕ˜) ≥ F (ϕ)− (αβ + cδ).
Lemma 4.1 permits us to restrict attention to s-uniform posteriors without much loss in our
objective. Since there are only ms such posteriors, a simple linear program with ms variables
computes an approximately optimal signaling scheme.
Theorem 4.2 (Polynomial-Time Signaling). If g is β-stable and c-Lipschitz, then for any constant
α, δ > 0, there exists a deterministic algorithm that constructs a signaling scheme with objective
value at least OPT −(αβ+cδ), where OPT is the value of the optimal signaling scheme. Moreover,
the algorithm runs in time poly(mδ
−2 ln(1/α)) · n · T , where T denotes the time needed to evaluate g
on a single input.
Proof. Let s be an integer with s ≥ (2δ−2 ln(2/α)), denote M = ms, and let {µ1, · · · , µM} be
the set of all s-uniform posteriors. Lemma 4.1 shows that restricting to s-uniform posteriors only
introduces an αβ + cδ additive loss in the objective. Thus it suffices to compute the optimal
signaling scheme supported only on s-uniform posteriors. This can be done using the following
linear program:
maximize
∑
j∈[M ] νj · g(Aµj)
subject to
∑
j∈[M ] νjµj = λ
ν ∈ ∆M
(4.3)
Note µj is the j’th s-uniform posterior — the only variables in this LP are ν1, . . . , νM .
Our proofs can be adapted to obtain a bi-criteria guarantee in the absence of Lipschitz conti-
nuity, as in Section 2. The following Theorem follows easily, and we omit the details.
Theorem 4.3 (Polynomial-Time Signaling (Bi-criteria)). Let g, h : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] be such
that g is β-stable and h is a (δ, ρ)-relaxation of g, and let α > 0 be a parameter. There exists a
deterministic algorithm which, when given as input a matrix A ∈ [−1, 1]n×m and a prior distribution
λ ∈ ∆m, constructs a signaling scheme ϕ = {(νσ , µσ)}σ∈Σ such that∑
σ∈Σ
νσh(Aµσ) ≥ OPT − αβ − ρ,
where OPT is the maximizer of F (ϕ∗) =
∑
σ∈Σ∗ ν
∗
σg(Aµ
∗
σ) over signaling schemes ϕ
∗ = {(ν∗σ, µ∗σ)}σ∈Σ∗ .
Moreover, the algorithm runs in time poly(mδ
−2 ln(1/α)) · n · T , where T denotes the time needed to
evaluate h on a single input.
2Note, however, that we can also “merge” all signals with the same posterior µ˜τ without loss.
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Remarks We note that our proof suggests an extension of the result in Theorem 4.2 to cases
in which f is given by a “black box” oracle, so long as we are promised that it is of the form
f(µ) = g(Aµ). In this model the runtime of our algorithm does not depend on n, but instead
depends on the cost of querying f . We also point out that that even though we precompute the
quality of all ms posteriors, we can guarantee that our output signaling scheme uses at most m+1
signals; this is because LP (4.3) has onlym+1 constraints, and therefore admits an optimal solution
where at most m+ 1 variables are non-zero.
5 Signaling in Probabilistic Second-Price Auctions
We examine signaling in probabilistic second-price auctions, as considered by Emek et al. [EFG+12]
and Miltersen and Sheffet [BMS12]. In this setting, the item being auctioned is probabilistic, and
the instantiation of the item is known to the auctioneer but not to the bidders. The auctioneer
commits to a signaling scheme for (partially) revealing information about the item for sale before
subsequently running a second-price auction. We consider a probabilistic second-price auction
described by the following parameters:
- An integer n denoting the number of bidders. We index the players by the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
- An integer m denoting the number of states of nature. We index states of nature by the set
Θ = {1, . . . ,m}. Each θ ∈ Θ represents a possible instantiation of the item being sold.
- A common-knowledge prior distribution λ ∈ ∆m on the states of nature.
- A common-knowledge prior distribution D on valuation matrices V ∈ [0, 1]n×m, given either
explicitly or as a “black-box” sampling oracle. For a valuation matrix V, entry Vij denotes
the value of player i for the item corresponding to state of nature j.
The game being played is the following: (a) The auctioneer first commits to a signaling scheme
ϕ : Θ → Σ; (b) A state of nature θ ∈ Θ is drawn according to λ and revealed to the auctioneer
but not the bidders; (c) The auctioneer reveals a public signal σ ∼ ϕ(θ) to all the bidders; (d) A
valuation matrix V ∈ [0, 1]n×m is drawn according to D, and each player i learns his value Vi,j for
each potential item j; (e) Finally, a second-price auction for the item is run.
As an example, consider an auction for an umbrella: the state of nature θ can be the weather
tomorrow, which determines the utility Vi,θ of an umbrella to player i. We assume that λ and D are
independent. We also emphasize that a bidder knows nothing about θ other than its distribution λ
and the public signal σ, and the auctioneer knows nothing about V besides its distribution D prior
to running the auction.
We adopt the (unique) dominant-strategy truth-telling equilibrium as our solution concept.
Specifically, given a signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ Σ and a signal σ ∈ Σ, in the subgame corresponding
to σ it is a dominant strategy for player i to bid Eθ∼λ[Viθ|ϕ(θ) = σ] — his posterior expected
value for the item conditioned on the received signal σ. Therefore the item goes to the player with
maximum posterior expected value, at a price equal to the second-highest posterior expected value.
The algorithmic problem we consider is the one faced by the auctioneer in step (a) — namely
computing an optimal signaling scheme — assuming the auctioneer looks to maximize expected
revenue. It was shown in [EFG+12, BMS12] that polynomial-time algorithms exist for several
special cases of this problem. However, the general problem was shown to be NP-hard even with
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3 bidders — specifically, no additive FPTAS exists unless P = NP. In this section, we resolve the
approximation complexity of this basic signaling problem by giving an additive PTAS. We note
that variations of this problem were considered in [GNS07, GD13], with different constraints on
the signaling scheme — the results in these works are not directly relevant to our model.
5.1 Revenue is Stable
Given a signaling scheme ϕ expressed as a decomposition {νσ, µσ}σ∈Σ of the prior distribution λ,
we can express the auctioneer’s expected revenue as∑
σ∈Σ
νσ E
V∼D
max2(Vµσ),
where the function max2 returns the second largest entry of a given vector, i.e. max2(t) = t[2]. To
apply our main theorem, we need to show that the revenue in a subgame with posterior distribution
µ ∈ ∆m — namely EV∼Dmax2(Vµ) — can be written in the form g(Wµ) for a matrix W . To
facilitate our discussion we assume that the valuation distribution D has finite support size C,
though this is without loss of generality. Imagine we form a large matrix W by stacking matrices
in the support of D on top of each other. Formally, W = [VT1 ,VT2 , · · · ,VTC ]T where Vi is the ith
matrix in the support of D. When matrix Vi is drawn from D, we take the second-highest bid from
the rows of W corresponding to Vi (rows (i− 1) ·n+1 to i ·n, where n is the number players). For
S ⊆ [nC] and t ∈ [0, 1]nC , let max2S(t) denote the second-highest value among entries of t indexed
by S. Then we can write the auctioneer’s expected revenue as
g(rev)(Wµ) = E
V∼D
max2S(V)(Wµ)
where S(V) is the set of rows in W corresponding to V.
Lemma 5.1 (Smooth and Stable Revenue). The function g(rev)(t) = EV∼Dmax2S(V)(t) is 1-
Lipschitz and 2-stable.
Proof. Because max2S is 1-Lipschitz for a fixed set of indices S, it follows that g
(rev), which is a
convex combination of these 1-Lipschitz functions, is also 1-Lipschitz.
To show that g(rev) is stable, we first show that the function max2 : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is stable.
Given t ∈ [0, 1]n and a random set R ⊆ [n] drawn from an α-light distribution D, the union bound
implies that R includes neither of the two largest entries of t with probability at least 1 − 2α. In
this case, the value of max2 is not affected by corruption of the entries indexed by R. Hence
E
R∼D
[
min{max2(t′) : t′ ≈
R
t}
]
≥ (1− 2α) ·max2(t) + 2α · 0 ≥ max2(t)− 2α.
Therefore max2 is 2-stable, which implies that max2S : [0, 1]
nC → [0, 1] is also 2-stable for any
fixed set of indices S. The function g(rev) is a convex combination of functions of the form max2S ,
and is therefore also 2-stable by Proposition 2.3.
Theorem 5.2. The revenue-maximizing signaling problem in probabilistic second-price auctions
admits an additive PTAS when the valuation distribution is given explicitly, and an additive PRAS
when the valuation distribution is given by a sampling oracle.
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Proof. Lemma 5.1 shows that the function g(rev) is 2-stable and 1-Lipschitz. If the valuation
distribution D is explicitly given with support size C, the function g(rev) can be evaluated in
poly(n,m,C) time. Then for any ǫ > 0, it follows from Theorem 4.2 by setting α = ǫ/4 and
δ = ǫ/2 that there is a deterministic algorithm that computes a signaling scheme with expected
revenue OPT − ǫ, in time poly(n,mǫ−2 ln(1/ǫ), C).
If D is given via a sampling oracle, standard tail bounds and the union bound imply that
C = Θ((s logm + log(γ−1))/ǫ2) samples from D suffice to estimate to within O(ǫ) the revenue
associated with every s-uniform posterior in ∆m, with success probability 1 − γ. Since revenue
is O(1)-stable and O(1)-Lipschitz, Lemma 4.1 implies that we can restrict attention to signaling
schemes with s-uniform posteriors for s = poly(1ǫ ). Proceeding as in Theorem 4.2, using the revenue
estimates from Monte-Carlo sampling in lieu of exact values, we can construct a signaling scheme
with revenue OPT − ǫ in time poly(n,mǫ−2 ln(1/ǫ), log( 1γ )), with success probability 1− γ.
6 Persuading Voters
In this section, we apply our mixture selection framework to natural signaling problems encountered
in the context of social choice, as introduced by Alonso and Caˆmara [AC14]. Consider an election
with two possible outcomes, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. For example, voters may need to choose whether to
adopt a new law or social policy; board members of a company may need to decide whether to
invest in a new project; and members of a jury must decide whether a defendant is declared guilty or
not guilty. As in [AC14], we focus on the scenario in which voters have uncertainty regarding their
utilities for the two possible outcomes (e.g., the risks and rewards of the new project). Specifically,
voters’ utilities are parameterized by an a-priori unknown state of nature θ drawn from a common-
knowledge prior distribution. We adopt the perspective of a principal with access to the realization
of θ, and looking to influence the outcome of the election by signaling.
Formally, we consider a voting setting with n voters and m states of nature. We index the
voters by the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and states of nature by the set Θ = {1, . . . ,m}. We assume
voters’ preferences are given by a matrix U ∈ [−1, 1]n×m, where Ui,j denotes voter i’s utility in
the event of a ‘Yes’ outcome in state of nature j. Without loss of generality, we assume utilities
are normalized so that each voter’s utility for a ‘No’ outcome is 0 in each state of nature. A
voter i who believes that the state of nature follows a distribution µ ∈ ∆m has expected utility
u(i, µ) =
∑
j∈Θ Ui,jµj for a ‘Yes’ outcome. In most voting systems with a binary outcome, including
for example threshold voting rules, it is a dominant strategy to vote ‘Yes’ if the utility u(i, µ) is
at least 0 and ‘No’ otherwise. For our approximation algorithms, we also allow implementation
in approximate dominant strategies — i.e., we sometimes assume a voter votes ‘Yes’ if his utility
u(i, µ) is at least −δ for a small parameter δ.3 We assume that the state of nature θ ∈ Θ is drawn
from a common prior λ ∈ ∆m, and a principal with access to θ reveals a public signal σ prior to
voters casting their votes. As usual, we adopt the perspective of a principal looking to commit to
a signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ Σ, for some set of signals Σ.
Alonso and Caˆmara [AC14] consider a principal interested in maximizing the probability that
at least 50% (or some given threshold) of the voters vote ’Yes’, in expectation over states of
nature. They characterize optimal signaling schemes analytically, though stop short of prescribing
an algorithm for signaling. Theirs is the natural objective when the election employs a majority
3Such relaxations seem necessary for our results. Moreover, depending on the context, modes of intervention for
shifting the votes of voters who are close to being indifferent may be realistic.
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(or threshold) voting rule, and the principal is interested in influencing the outcome of the vote.
Approximating this objective requires nontrivial modifications to our framework, and therefore we
begin this section by examining a different, yet also natural, objective: the expected number of
’Yes’ votes. We design a bi-criteria approximation scheme for this objective, then describe the
necessary modifications for the threshold function objective of [AC14].
6.1 Maximizing Expected Number of Votes
We now examine bi-criteria approximation algorithms for maximizing the expected number of
‘Yes’ votes. For our benchmark, we use the function g(vote-sum)(t) :=
∑
i∈[n]
1
nI[ti ≥ 0], where
I[E ] denotes the indicator function for event E . Assuming voters vote ‘Yes’ precisely when their
posterior expected utility for a ‘Yes’ outcome is nonnegative, the number of ‘Yes’ votes when voters
have preferences U ∈ [−1, 1]n×m and posterior belief µ ∈ ∆m equals g(vote-sum)(Uµ). When the
state of nature is distributed according to a common prior λ, and voters are informed according
to signaling ϕ inducing a decomposition {µσ, νσ}σ∈Σ of λ, the expected number of ‘Yes’ votes
equals F (vote-sum)(ϕ,U, λ) :=
∑
σ∈Σ νσg
(vote-sum)(Uµσ). We use OPT
(vote-sum)(U, λ) to denote the
maximum value of F (vote-sum)(ϕ,U, λ) over signaling schemes ϕ.
As the first step to apply our framework, we prove that g(vote-sum) is stable.
Lemma 6.1. The function g(vote-sum) is 1-stable.
Proof. For each voter i ∈ [n], let gi : [−1, 1]n → {0, 1} be the function indicating whether voter i
prefers the ‘Yes’ outcome, i.e., gi(t) = I[ti ≥ 0]. Each individual gi is 1-stable, because as long as the
i’th input ti is not corrupted the output of gi does not change. Therefore g
(vote-sum)(t) = 1n
n∑
i=1
gi(t),
being a convex combination of 1-stable functions, is 1-stable by Proposition 2.3.
Unfortunately, g(vote-sum) is not O(1)-Lipschitz. We therefore employ the bi-criteria extension
to our framework from Definition 2.7. Specifically, for a parameter δ > 0, we assume a voter
votes ‘Yes’ as long as his expected utility from a ‘Yes’ outcome is at least −δ. Correspondingly,
we define the relaxed function g
(vote-sum)
δ (t) :=
∑
i∈[n]
1
nI[ti ≥ −δ]; the expected number of ‘Yes’
votes from a signaling scheme ϕ = {µσ, νσ}σ∈Σ can analogously be written as F (vote-sum)δ (ϕ,U, λ) :=∑
σ∈Σ νσg
(vote-sum)
δ (Uµσ).
It is easy to verify that g
(vote-sum)
δ is an (δ, 0)-relaxation of g
(vote-sum); combining this fact with
Theorem 4.3 yields a bi-criteria approximation scheme for the problem of maximizing the expected
number of ‘Yes’ votes.
Theorem 6.2. Let ǫ, δ > 0 be parameters, let U ∈ [−1, 1]n×m describe the preferences of n voters
in m states of nature, and let λ ∈ ∆m be the prior of states of nature. There is an algorithm
with runtime poly(m
ln(1/ǫ)
δ2 , n) for computing a signaling scheme ϕ such that F
(vote-sum)
δ (ϕ,U, λ) ≥
OPT (vote-sum)(U, λ)− ǫ.
Using the same techniques as in Section 3.2, we can extend this result to the case where the
valuations of voters are drawn from a distribution give either explicitly or by a sampling oracle.
We omit the details.
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6.2 Maximizing Probability of a Majority Vote
We now sketch the necessary modifications when the principal is interested in maximizing the
probability of a ‘Yes’ outcome, assuming a majority voting rule. We make two relaxations, which
appear necessary for our framework: we assume a voter votes ‘Yes’ as long as his expected utility
from a ‘Yes’ outcome is at least −δ, and assume that the ‘Yes’ outcome is attained when at least a
(0.5 − δ) fraction of voters vote ‘Yes’. Our benchmark will be the maximum probability of a ’Yes’
outcome in the absence of these two relaxations.
We define our benchmark using the function g(vote-thresh)(t) = I[g(vote-sum)(t) ≥ 0.5] which
evaluates to 1 if at least half of its n inputs are nonnegative, and to 0 otherwise. This function is
not O(1)-stable, so we work with a more stringent benchmark which is. Specifically, for a parameter
δ > 0, we use the function g
(vote-smooth-thresh)
δ which is pointwise greater than or equal to g
(vote-thresh),
defined as follows:
g
(vote-smooth-thresh)
δ (t) =
{
1
δ
(
g(vote-sum)(t)− 0.5 + δ) if g(vote-sum)(t) ∈ [0.5 − δ, 0.5]
g(vote-thresh)(t) otherwise.
Observe that g
(vote-smooth-thresh)
δ applies a continuous piecewise-linear function to the output of
g(vote-sum). It is easy to verify that g
(vote-smooth-thresh)
δ is
1
δ -stable, and upperbounds g
(vote-thresh).
Finally, to measure the quality of our output we define the relaxed function g
(vote-thresh)
δ :
[−1, 1]n → {0, 1}, which outputs 1 if at least a (0.5 − δ) fraction of its inputs exceed −δ, and
outputs 0 otherwise. By Definition 2.7, g
(vote-thresh)
δ is a (δ, 0)-relaxation of g
(vote-smooth-thresh)
δ (and,
consequently, also of g(vote-thresh)).
As usual, let F (vote-thresh)(ϕ,U, λ) and F
(vote-thresh)
δ (ϕ,U, λ) denote the functions which evaluate
the quality of a signaling ϕ scheme using g(vote-thresh) and g
(vote-thresh)
δ , respectively. Moreover, let
OPT (vote-thresh)(U, λ) be the maximum value of F (vote-thresh)(ϕ,U, λ) over signaling schemes ϕ. We
apply Theorem 4.3 to g
(vote-thresh)
δ and g
(vote-smooth-thresh), setting α = ǫδ, and use the fact that
g(vote-smooth-thresh) upperbounds our true benchmark g(vote-thresh) , to conclude the following.
Theorem 6.3. Let ǫ, δ > 0 be parameters, let U ∈ [−1, 1]n×m describe the preferences of n voters
in m states of nature, and let λ ∈ ∆m be the prior of states of nature. There is an algorithm with
runtime poly(m
ln(1/ǫδ)
δ2 , n) for computing a signaling scheme ϕ such that F
(vote-thresh)
δ (ϕ,U, λ) ≥
OPT (vote-thresh)(U, λ)− ǫ.
6.3 Connection to Maximum Feasible Subsystem of Linear Inequalities
Turning our attention away from signaling, we note that g(vote-sum)(Ax) simply counts the number
of satisfied inequalities in the system Ax  0. Mixture selection for g(vote-sum) is therefore the
problem of maximizing the number of satisfied inequalities over the simplex. Using our framework
from Section 2, we obtain a bi-criteria PTAS for this problem. Moreover, using Monte-Carlo
sampling, our bi-criteria PTAS extends to the model in which A is given implicitly; specifically,
the rows of A correspond to the sample space of a distribution D over [−1, 1]m, and are weighted
accordingly. In this implicit model, we can think of mixture selection for g(vote-sum) as the problem
of finding x ∈ ∆m which maximizes the probability that a · x ≥ 0 for a ∼ D.
Motivated by systems applications, Daskalakis et al. [DDD+14] consider a special case of this
problem termed Fault-Tolerant Distributed Storage. Their problem is equivalent to mixture selection
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for g(vote-sum) in the implicit model, with the additional restriction that D is a product distribution
over binary vectors with marginal probabilities given explicitly. They present an additive EPTAS
for this problem in a uni-criteria sense. Our framework relaxes their restrictions on D, at the cost
of a bi-criteria guarantee and exponential dependence on the error parameters.
7 Signaling in Bayesian Normal Form Games
We consider normal form games of incomplete information, in which payoffs are parameterized by
a state of nature θ. A principal has access to the exact realization of θ, whereas the players initially
share a prior belief on θ and form a posterior belief based on the information revealed by the
principal. The goal of the principal is then to commit to revealing certain information about θ —
i.e., a signaling scheme — to induce a favorable equilibrium over the resulting Bayesian subgames.
Signaling in normal form games has recently been examined from a complexity-theoretic per-
spective. Dughmi [Dug14] considered the special case of two-player zero-sum games, and examined
the design of symmetric signaling schemes with the goal of maximizing the expected utility of one of
the players. It was shown that no FPTAS is possible for the signaling problem for zero sum games,
assuming the planted clique conjecture. In this section, we complement the impossibility result
of [Dug14] with a bi-criteria quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) which applies
to normal form games with a constant number of players, slightly relaxing both the equilibrium
definition and the polynomial-time restriction. It remains open if signaling for Bayesian zero-sum
games admits a PTAS.
7.1 Background and Notation
We make heavy use of tensors in describing multi-player games. Specifically, we focus on n-
dimensional tensors of order k with entries in [−1, 1], where n is typically the number of strategies
per player and k is the number of players. We think of these tensors as functions T : [n]k → [−1, 1]
mapping a strategy profile s ∈ [n]k to a number in [−1, 1]. Such a tensor T also naturally describes
a multilinear map; overloading notation, given k vectors x1, . . . , xk ∈ Rn we write T (x1 . . . , xk) =∑
s1,...,sk∈[n]
(
T (s1, . . . , sk) ·
∏k
i=1 xi(si)
)
. This is most natural when x1, . . . , xk ∈ ∆n form a mixed
strategy profile, in which case T (x1, . . . , xk) evaluates the expected value of T over pure strategy
profiles drawn from (x1, . . . , xk).
A Bayesian normal form game is defined by the following parameters:
- An integer k denoting the number of players, indexed by the set [k] = {1, . . . , k}.
- An integer n bounding the number of pure strategies of each player. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume each player has exactly n pure strategies, and index them by the set
[n] = {1, . . . , n}.
- An integer m denoting the number of states of nature. We index states of nature by the set
Θ = {1, . . . ,m}, and use the variable θ to represent a state of nature.
- A common prior distribution λ ∈ ∆m on states of nature.
- A family of payoff tensors Aθi : [n]k → [−1, 1], one per player i and state of nature θ, where
Aθi (s1, . . . , sk) is the payoff to player i when the state of nature is θ and each player j plays
strategy sj.
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Note that a game of complete information is the special case with m = 1 — i.e., the state of
nature is fixed and known to all. In a general Bayesian normal form game, absent any information
about the state of nature beyond the prior λ, risk neutral players will behave as in the complete
information game Eθ∼λ[Aθ]. We consider signaling schemes which partially and symmetrically
inform players by publicly announcing a signal σ, correlated with θ; this induces a common posterior
belief on the state of nature for each value of σ. When players’ posterior belief over θ is given by
µ ∈ ∆m, we use Aµ to denote the equivalent complete information game Eθ∼µ[Aθ]. As shorthand,
we use Aµi (x1, . . . , xk) to denote E[Aθi (s1, . . . , sk)] when θ ∼ µ ∈ ∆m and si ∼ xi ∈ ∆n. In the
event that the state of nature is θ and players play the pure strategy profile s1, . . . , sk, we refer to
the tuple (θ, s1, . . . , sk) as the state of play. For our result, we assume that a Bayesian game (A, λ)
is represented explicitly as a vector λ ∈ ∆m and a list of tensors {Aθi ∈ [−1, 1]n
k
: i ∈ [k], θ ∈ [m]}.
We adopt the approximate Nash equilibrium as our equilibrium concept. There are two variants.
Definition 7.1. Let ǫ ≥ 0. In a k-player n-action normal form game with expected payoffs in [−1, 1]
given by tensors A1, . . . ,Ak, a mixed strategy profile x1, . . . , xk ∈ ∆n is an ǫ-Nash Equilibrium (ǫ-
NE) if
Ai(x1, . . . , xk) ≥ Ai(ti, x−i)− ǫ
for every player i and alternative pure strategy ti ∈ [n].
Definition 7.2. Let ǫ ≥ 0. In a k-player n-action normal form game with expected payoffs in
[−1, 1] given by tensors A1, . . . ,Ak, a mixed strategy profile x1, . . . , xk ∈ ∆n is an ǫ-well-supported
Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) if
Ai(si, x−i) ≥ Ai(ti, x−i)− ǫ
for every player i, strategy si in the support of xi, and alternative pure strategy ti ∈ [n].
Clearly, every ǫ-WSNE is also an ǫ-NE. When ǫ = 0, both correspond to the exact Nash
Equilibrium. Note that we omitted reference to the state of nature in the above definitions — in a
subgame corresponding to posterior beliefs µ ∈ ∆m, we naturally use tensors Aµ1 , . . .Aµk instead.
Fixing an equilibrium concept (NE, ǫ-NE, or ǫ-WSNE), a Bayesian game (A, λ), and a signaling
scheme ϕ : Θ → Σ, an equilibrium selection rule distinguishes an equilibrium strategy profile
(xσ1 , . . . , x
σ
k) to be played in each subgame σ — we call the tuple X = {xσi : σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [k]} a
Bayesian equilibrium of the game (A, λ) with signaling scheme ϕ. Together with the prior λ, the
Bayesian equilibrium X induces a distribution Γ ∈ ∆Θ×[n]k over states of play — we refer to Γ
as a distribution of play. This is analogous to implementation of allocation rules in traditional
mechanism design.
Our results concern objectives which depend only on the state of play, and we seek to maximize
the objective in expectation over the distribution of play. These include, but are not restricted to,
the social welfare of the players, as well as weighted combinations of player utilities. Formally, our
objective is described by a family of tensors Fθ : [n]k → [−1, 1], one for each state of nature θ ∈ Θ.
Equivalently, we may think of the objective as describing the payoffs of an additional player in the
game — namely the principal. For a distribution µ over states of nature, we use Fµ = Eθ∼µFθ
to denote the principal’s expected utility in a subgame with posterior beliefs µ, as a function of
players’ strategies.
For a signaling scheme ϕ and associated (approximate) equilibria X = {xσi : σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [k]}, our
objective function can be written as F (ϕ,X) = Eθ∼λ Eσ∼ϕ(θ) E~s∼xσ [F(θ,~s)]. When ϕ corresponds
to a convex decomposition {(µσ, νσ)}σ∈Σ of the prior distribution, this can be equivalently written
20
as F (ϕ,X) =
∑
σ∈Σ νσFµσ (xσ). Let OPT = OPT (A, λ,F) denote the maximizer of F (ϕ∗,X∗)
over signaling schemes ϕ∗ and (exact) Nash equilibria X∗. We seek a signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ Σ,
as well as a Bayesian ǫ-NE (or ǫ-WSNE) X such that F (ϕ,X) ≥ OPT − ǫ.
We will use the following Lemma, which follows easily from the results of Lipton et al. [LMM03],
to restrict attention to equilibria with small support.
Lemma 7.3. Let tensors A1, . . . ,Ak : [n]k → [−1, 1] describe a k-player game of complete informa-
tion with n pure strategies per player, and let F : [n]k → [−1, 1] be a tensor describing an objective
function on mixed strategies. Define the function r(ǫ) = 3(k+1)
2 ln((k+1)2n)
ǫ2
. For each ǫ > 0, integer
s ≥ r(ǫ), and mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xk), there is a profile x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜k) of s-uniform
mixed strategies such that |Ai(x) − Ai(x˜)| ≤ ǫ for all players i, |F(x) − F(x˜)| ≤ ǫ, and if x is a
Nash equilibrium of A then x˜ is an ǫ-equilibrium of A. This holds for both NE and WSNE.
Proof. We can think of the tensor Fµ : [n]k → [−1, 1] as describing the utility of an additional
player in the game with a trivial strategy set. The rest follows from [LMM03, Theorem 2].
7.2 QPTAS for Signaling in Normal Form Games
We prove the following bi-criteria result.
Theorem 7.4. Let ǫ > 0 denote an approximation parameter, let (A, λ) be a Bayesian normal form
game with k = O(1) players, n actions, and m states of nature, and let F : [m] × [n]k → [−1, 1]
be an objective function given as a tensor. There is an algorithm with runtime poly(m
ln(n/ǫ)
ǫ2 , n
lnn
ǫ2 )
which outputs a signaling scheme ϕ and corresponding Bayesian ǫ-equilibria X satisfying F (ϕ,X) ≥
OPT (A, λ,F)− ǫ. This holds for both approximate NE and approximate WSNE.
In other words, when the number of players is a constant we can in quasi-polynomial time
approximate the optimal reward from signaling while losing an additive ǫ in the objective as well
as in the incentive constraints, as compared to the optimal signaling scheme / Nash equilibrium
combination.
Fix ǫ > 0. To prove this theorem, we define functions g and gǫ which each take as input a k-
player n-action game of complete information B, given as payoff tensors B1 . . . ,Bk : [n]k → [−1, 1],
and an objective tensor G : [n]k → [−1, 1], and output a number in [−1, 1]. Specifically, g(B,G) =
max{G(x) : x ∈ EQ(B)} and gǫ(B,G) = max{G(x) : x ∈ EQǫ(B)}, where EQ(B) denotes the set
of Nash equilibria of the game B, and EQǫ(B) denotes the (non-empty) set of ⌈r(ǫ/4)⌉-uniform
ǫ-Nash equilibria (or ǫ-WSNE) for r as given in Lemma 7.3. Recall that G(x) denotes evaluating
the multilinear map described by tensor G at the mixed strategy profile x ∈ ∆kn.
Now suppose we fix a Bayesian game (A, λ) and objective tensor F as in the statement of
Theorem 7.4. For a subgame with a posterior distribution µ ∈ ∆m over states of nature, the
principal’s expected utility at the “best” Nash equilibrium of this subgame can be written as
g(Aµ,Fµ). Similarly, the principal’s expected utility at the “best” ⌈r(ǫ/4)⌉-uniform ǫ-NE (or
ǫ-WSNE) can be written as gǫ(Aµ,Fµ). Observe that the input to both g and gǫ is a linear
function of µ, as need to apply the results in Section 4. For a signaling scheme ϕ corresponding
to a decomposition λ =
∑
σ∈Σ νσ · µσ of the prior distribution λ into posterior distributions (see
Section 4.1), we can write the principal’s expected utility assuming the “best” Nash equilibrium as
F (ϕ) =
∑
σ∈Σ νσg(F
µσ ,Aµσ), and assuming the “best” ⌈r(ǫ/4)⌉-uniform ǫ-equilibrium as Fǫ(ϕ) =∑
σ∈Σ νσgǫ(F
µσ ,Aµσ ). We use OPT to denote the maximum value of F over all signaling schemes.
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We prove Theorem 7.4 by exhibiting an algorithm for computing a signaling scheme ϕ such
that Fǫ(ϕ) ≥ OPT − ǫ. The proof hinges on two main lemmas.
Lemma 7.5. The function g is 2(k + 1)nk-stable.
Proof. As noted in Section 2, any function mapping a hypercube [−1, 1]N to the interval [−1, 1] is
2N stable. The function g is such a function with N = (k + 1)nk.
Lemma 7.6. The function gǫ is an (ǫ/4, ǫ/2)-relaxation of g.
Proof. Consider tensors G, G˜ : [n]k → [−1, 1] with |G(s) − G˜(s)| ≤ ǫ/4 for all s ∈ [n]k, and two
k-player n-action games B = (B1, . . . ,Bk) and B˜ = (B˜1, . . . , B˜k) with |Bi(s) − B˜i(s)| ≤ ǫ/4 for all
s ∈ [n]k. It suffices to show that gǫ(B˜, G˜) ≥ g(B,G)− ǫ/2. Let x ∈ ∆kn be the Bayesian equilibrium
of B for which G(x) = g(B,G). By Lemma 7.3, there is a profile x˜ of ⌈r(ǫ/4)⌉-uniform mixed
strategies such that x˜ is an ǫ/4-equilibrium of B, and G(x˜) ≥ G(x)− ǫ/4. Since B˜ differs from B by
at most ǫ/4 everywhere, it follows that x˜ is an ǫ-equilibrium of B˜, i.e. x˜ ∈ EQǫ(B˜). Similarly, since
G˜ differs from G by at most ǫ/4 everywhere, it follows that G˜(x˜) ≥ G(x˜) − ǫ/4 ≥ G(x) − ǫ/2. We
conclude that gǫ(B˜, G˜) ≥ G˜(x˜) ≥ g(B,G) − ǫ/2.
We now complete the proof of Theorem 7.4 by instantiating Theorem 4.3 with g, h = gǫ, and
α = ǫ
4(k+1)nk
. The runtime is poly(m
ln(1/α)
ǫ2 , (k + 1)nk, T ), where T is the time needed to evaluate
gǫ (and compute the corresponding ⌈r(ǫ/4)⌉-uniform ǫ-equilibrium) on a given input. Recall that
k = O(1) and α = ǫpoly(n) . Moreover, using brute-force enumeration of all ⌈r(ǫ/4)⌉-uniform mixed
strategy profiles we conclude that T is bounded by a polynomial in n
lnn
ǫ2 . Therefore our total
runtime is poly(m
ln(n/ǫ)
ǫ2 , n
lnn
ǫ2 ), as needed.
Remarks In the special case of two-player zero-sum games and a principal interested in max-
imizing one player’s utility, as studied in [Dug14], our techniques lead to a more efficient ap-
proximation scheme and a uni-criteria guarantee. This is because the principal’s payoff tensor
G equals the payoff tensor B of one of the players (say, player 1), and consequently the func-
tion g(B,G) = g(B,B) = maxxminy x⊺By is n2-stable and 2-Lipschitz. Its Lipschitz continuity
follows from the fact that an ǫ-equilibrium of a zero-sum game leads to utilities within ǫ of the
equilibrium utilities. Moreover, evaluating g now takes time T = poly(m,n). Theorem 4.2 in-
stantiated with α = ǫ4n2 and δ = ǫ/4, leads to an algorithm with runtime poly(m
ln(n/ǫ)
ǫ2 , n), which
outputs a signaling scheme ϕ and corresponding Bayesian (exact) Nash-equilibria X satisfying
F (ϕ,X) ≥ OPT (A, λ,F) − ǫ.
8 Hardness Results
In this section, we present hardness results which justify our assumptions, and exhibit the limi-
tations of our techniques. Specifically, we show in Sections 8.1 and 8.2 that neither stability nor
Lipschitz continuity alone suffices for an additive PTAS. In Section 8.3, we show that even in the
presence of Lipschitz continuity and noise stability, obtaining an additive FPTAS would imply P
= NP.
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8.1 NP-Hardness in the Absence of Lipschitz Continuity
We now show that stability alone does not suffice for an additive PTAS for mixture selection, in
general. First, we show that mixture selection for the 1-stable function g(vote-sum), presented in
Section 6, does not admit a (uni-criteria) additive PTAS unless P = NP. Being that g(vote-sum) is
not continuous in any metric, we drive the point home by exhibiting a “smoothed” function g(slope)
which is 1-stable and O(1)-Lipschitz with respect to L1, but not O(1)-Lipschitz with respect to
L∞, and show that mixture selection for g(slope) still does not admit an additive PTAS unless P =
NP.
Both NP-hardness results share a similar reduction from themaximum independent set problem.
We use a consequence of the result by [KS12], namely that there exists a constant ǫ such that it
is NP-hard to approximate maximum independent set to within an additive error of ǫn, where n
denotes the number of vertices.
Given an n-node undirected graph G, let OPTIS = OPTIS(G) be the size of its largest indepen-
dent set. We define the n× n matrix A = A(G) as follows:
- Diagonal entries of A are all 12 (Ai,i =
1
2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
- When vertices i and j share an edge in G, both Ai,j and Aj,i are −1.
- All other entries of A, namely Ai,j for non-adjacent distinct vertices i and j, are − 14n .
We relate OPTIS to convex combinations of the columns of A as follows.
Observation 8.1. Let I be an independent set of G with |I| = k. There exists x ∈ ∆n such that
k entries of Ax are at least 14n , and all remaining entries are strictly negative.
Proof. Let x ∈ ∆n be the normalized indicator vector of I — i.e., xi = 1k if i ∈ I and xi = 0
otherwise. By construction (Ax)i =
1
k (
1
2 − (k − 1) 14n ) ≥ 14n whenever i ∈ I, and (Ax)i ≤ − 14n
otherwise.
Observation 8.2. For any x ∈ ∆n, nonnegative entries of Ax correspond to an independent set
of G. Consequently, Ax can have at most OPTIS nonnegative entries.
Proof. Let t = Ax. Consider an edge {i, j} of graph G, and without loss of generality assume that
xi ≥ xj . If xi = 0, then ti ≤ − 14n < 0 by construction. Othewise, tj ≤
xj
2 − xi < 0. Therefore, ti
and tj cannot be both nonnegative. We conclude that the nonnegative coordinates of t correspond
to an independent set of G.
Observations 8.1 and 8.2 imply that maxx∈∆n g
(vote-sum)(Ax) = OPTISn . Combined with the fact
that obtaining an additive PTAS for the maximum independent set problem is NP-hard, we get
the following theorem.
Theorem 8.3. Mixture selection for the 1-stable function g(vote-sum) admits no additive PTAS
unless P = NP.
Noting that g(vote-sum) is a discontinuous function, for emphasis we exhibit a function g(slope)
which is Lipschitz continuous in L1 (but not in L∞) and 1-noise stable, but for which the same
impossibility result holds by an identical reduction. Informally, g(slope) “smoothes” the threshold
behavior of g(vote-sum) as follows: each input ti contributes 0 to g
(slope)(t) when ti ≤ 0, contributes
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1
n when ti ≥ 14n , and the contribution is a linear function of ti increasing from 0 to 1n for ti ∈ [0, 14n ].
Formally, we define g(slope)(t) =
∑n
i=1min
{
4max {0, ti} , 1n
}
. Since each entry of t contributes
at most 1n to g
(slope)(t), it is easy to verify that g(slope) is 1-stable. Moreover, since the partial
derivatives of g(slope)(t) are upper-bounded by 4, it is 4-Lipschitz continuous with respect to the L1
metric. Observations 8.1 and 8.2 imply that maxx∈∆n g
(slope)(Ax) = OPTISn , ruling out an additive
PTAS for mixture selection for g(slope).
Theorem 8.4. The function g(slope) is 1-stable and O(1)-Lipschitz with respect to L1, and yet
mixture selection for g(slope) admits no additive PTAS unless P = NP.
8.2 Planted-Clique Hardness in the Absence of Stability
We now present evidence that Lipschitz continuity alone does not suffice for a PTAS for mixture
selection. Recalling that a quasipolynomial time algorithm follows from our framework whenever a
function is O(1)-Lipschitz, we reduce from the planted clique problem—for which a quasipolynomial
time algorithm exists, and yet a polynomial-time algorithm is conjectured not to exist—rather than
from an NP-hard problem.
In the planted clique problem, one must distinguish the n-node Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph
G(n, 12), in which each edge is included independently with probability 12 , from the graph G(n, 12 , k)
formed by “planting” a clique in G(n, 12 ) at a randomly (or, equivalently, adversarially) chosen
set of k nodes. This problem was first considered by by Jerrum [Jer92] and Kuc˘era [Kucˇ95], and
has been the subject of a large body of work since. A quasi-polynomial time algorithm exists
when k ≥ 2 log n, and the best polynomial-time algorithms only succeed for k = Ω(√n) (see e.g.,
[AKS98] [DGGP11] [FR10] [CO10]). Several papers suggest that the problem is hard for k = o(
√
n)
by ruling out natural classes of algorithmic approaches (e.g. [Jer92, FK03, FGR+13]). The planted
clique problem has therefore found use as a hardness assumption in a variety of applications (e.g.
[AAK+07], [JP00], [HK11], [MV09], [Dug14]). We use the following well-believed conjecture as our
hardness assumption.
Assumption 8.5. For some function k = k(n) satisfying k = ω(log2 n) and k = o(
√
n), there is
no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can distinguish between a random graph drawn from
G(n, 12) and a random graph drawn from G(n, 12 , k) with success probability 1− o(1).
We let k = k(n) be as in Assumption 8.5, and consider mixture selection for the function
g
(clique)
k : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] with g(clique)k (t) = t[k]− t[k+1]+ t[n], where t[i] denotes the i’th largest entry
of the vector t. It is easy to verify that g
(clique)
k is 3-Lipschitz with respect to the L
∞ metric, yet is
not O(1)-stable. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8.6. Assumption 8.5 implies that there is no additive PTAS for mixture selection for
g
(clique)
k .
To prove Theorem 8.6, we show that maxx∈∆n g
(clique)
k (Ax) is arbitrarily close to 1 with high
probability when A is the adjacency matrix of G ∼ G(n, 12 , k), and is bounded away from 1 with
high probability when A is the adjacency matrix of G ∼ G(n, 12). For convenience, and without
loss of generality, we assume that both random graphs include each self-loop with probability 12 —
i.e., diagonal entries of the adjacency matrix A are independent uniform draws from {0, 1} in both
cases. Our argument is captured by the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 8.7. Fix a constant ǫ > 0. Let G ∼ G(n, 12 , k), and let A be its adjacency matrix. With
probability 1− o(1), there exists an x ∈ ∆n such that g(clique)k (Ax) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Proof. Let C denote the vertices of the planted k-clique. We set xi = 1k if i ∈ C and 0 otherwise.
Let t = Ax. For i ∈ C, ti ≥ 1 − 1k . On the other hand, all other entries of t concentrate around
1
2 with high probability. For i /∈ C, ti is simply the average of k independent Bernoulli random
variables by definition of G(n, 12 , k); using Hoeffding’s inequality, we bound the probability that ti
deviates from its expectation by more than a constant δ > 0, to be chosen later:
Pr
[∣∣∣∣ti − 12
∣∣∣∣ > δ] ≤ 2e−2δ2k.
By the union bound, ti ∈ [12 − δ, 12 + δ] simultaneously for all i /∈ C with probability at least
1− 2logn−Ω(k) = 1− o(1). Thus t[k+1] − t[n] ≤ 2δ and g(clique)k (t) = t[k] − (t[k+1] − t[n]) ≥ 1− 1k − 2δ
with probability 1− o(1). Choosing δ = ǫ/3, we conclude that g(clique)k (t) ≥ 1 − ǫ with probability
1− o(1).
Lemma 8.8. Fix a constant ǫ > 0. Let G ∼ G(n, 12), and let A be its adjacency matrix. With
probability 1− o(1), g(clique)k (Ax) ≤ 34 + ǫ for all x ∈ ∆n.
Proof. Recall that g
(clique)
k is O(1)-Lipschitz and — like any other function from the hypercube
to the bounded interval — O(n)-stable. If there exists x∗ such that g
(clique)
k (Ax
∗) ≥ 34 + ǫ, then
Theorem 2.5 implies that there is an integer s = O(log n) and an s-uniform vector x˜ such that
g
(clique)
k (Ax˜) >
3
4 . There are n
s such vectors. We next show that for an arbitrary fixed vector
x ∈ ∆n the probability that g(clique)k (Ax) > 34 is at most 2−Ω(k). This would complete the proof by
the union bound, since 1− ns · 2−Ω(k) = 1− o(1).
Fix x ∈ ∆n, and let t = Ax. Define D as the distribution supported on [0, 1] which is sampled
as follows: draw a uniformly from {0, 1}n, and output a · x. Since A is the adjacency matrix of
G ∼ G(n, 12 ), each entry ti of t can be viewed as an independent draw from D. We exploit a key
property of D in our proof, namely the fact that D is symmetric about 12 . Formally we mean that
PrD[r] = PrD[1− r] for all r ∈ [0, 1], and this follows easily from the definition of D.
Symmetry of D implies that Prr∼D[r ≥ 12 ] = Prr∼D[r ≤ 12 ] ≥ 12 . Recalling that k = o(n) and
that entries of t are independent draws from D, the Chernoff bound implies that the following holds
with probability at least 1− 2−Ω(n):
t[n] ≤
1
2
≤ t[k+1]. (8.1)
If g
(clique)
k (t) >
3
4 , then the following two conditions must hold:
1. t[k] >
3
4 , and
2. t[k+1] − t[n] < 14 .
Condition 1 implies that the k largest entries of t are all at least 34 . Furthermore, unless Inequal-
ity (8.1) is violated — an event with small probability 2−Ω(n) — Condition 2 implies that remaining
entries of t are all strictly between 14 and
3
4 . Let p denote Prr∼D[r ≤ 14 ], also equal to Prr∼D[r ≥ 34 ]
by symmetry of D. The probability that k entries of t are at least 34 and all remaining entries
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are in (14 ,
3
4 ) is given by
(n
k
)
pk(1 − 2p)n−k, which is maximized at p = k2n , with maximum value
2−Ω(k). In summary, the probability that g
(clique)
k (Ax) >
3
4 is at most 2
−Ω(k) + 2−Ω(n) = 2−Ω(k), as
needed.
8.3 NP-hardness of an additive FPTAS
Our last hardness proof rules out an additive FPTAS for the lottery design problem, a.k.a. mixture
selection for the function g(lottery), as defined in Section 3. We restrict attention to the weight vector
w assigning equal weight to all inputs to g(lottery), and therefore omit references to the weight vector
for the remainder of this section.
Theorem 8.9. The lottery design problem, a.k.a. mixture selection for g(lottery), admits no additive
FPTAS unless P = NP.
Proof. The proof involves a reduction from the independent set problem which is very similar to the
reduction in Section 8.1, so we only detail the necessary modifications. Given an n-node undirected
graph G, we define an n× n matrix A = A(G) as in Section 8.1, though shifted and normalized so
entries lie in [0, 1]. Specifically, we set diagonal entries of A to 34 , and we set an off-diagonal entry
Aij to 0 if i and j share an edge and to
1
2 − 18n otherwise. Observation 8.2 implies that for every
x ∈ ∆n, entries of Ax which are at least 12 correspond to an independent set of G. Observation
8.1 implies that there is a vector x∗ ∈ ∆n so that Ax∗ has exactly OPTIS(G) entries no less than
p∗ := 12 +
1
8n .
Our input to the lottery design problem will be a valuation matrix B with 8n2 + n rows and n
columns, obtained from A by adding 8n2 “dummy” rows, each of which is (p∗, . . . , p∗). Setting a
price of p∗ for the lottery x∗ results in expected revenue r∗ := p∗ · 8n2+OPTIS
8n2+n
= (12+
1
8n)· 8n
2+OPTIS
8n2+n
>
1
2 . Therefore, r
∗ lower-bounds maxx∈∆n g
(lottery)(Bx). We claim that r∗ is in fact the maximum
value of this mixture selection problem, and prove this by fixing an arbitrary lottery x ∈ ∆n and
conducting a simple case analysis on the associated price p:
- When p∗ < p ≤ 1, none of the “dummy” types purchase the lottery x, resulting in expected
revenue at most n
8n2+n
< 12 < r
∗.
- When 12 ≤ p ≤ p∗, all dummy types purchase x, and the i’th non-dummy type purchases x
only if (Ax)i ≥ 12 . Since entries of Ax which are no less than 12 correspond to an independent
set of G, at most 8n2+OPTIS types purchase the lottery x, resulting in expected revenue at
most p · 8n2+OPTIS
8n2+n
≤ r∗.
- When 0 ≤ p < 12 , the best case scenario is that all buyer types purchase the lottery at price
p, yielding expected revenue at most p < 12 < r
∗.
Recalling that there exists a constant ǫ > 0 for which the maximum independent set problem
does not admit an additive ǫn-approximation algorithm in polynomial time, we conclude that
mixture selection for g(lottery) does not admit a polynomial-time additive ǫ′-approximation algorithm
for any ǫ′ = ǫ′(n) ≤ (12 + 18n) ǫ8n+1 . This rules out an additive FPTAS.
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9 Connection to Boolean Function Analysis
In Definition 2.2, stability of a function from the solid hypercube to the bounded interval was defined
as robustness to corruption patterns which follow a light distribution. In this section, we exhibit a
closely-related algebraic notion of stability, based on Fourier analysis of Boolean functions. Instead
of using light distributions directly, we describe the effects of corruption on a function g at input t in
the solid hypercube by a Boolean function ht. In particular, ht takes as input a vector z ∈ {−1, 1}n,
interprets zi = 1 as forbidding corruption of input ti and zi = −1 as permitting corruption of ti,
and considers the worst-case such corruption of t. Formally, denoting I+(z) := {i ∈ [n] : zi = 1}
and I−(z) := {i ∈ [n] : zi = −1}, we define Boolean extensions of g at an input t.
Definition 9.1 (Boolean extension). Let g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1], and let t ∈ [−1, 1]n. A Boolean
function ht : {−1, 1}n → [−1, 1] is called a Boolean extension of g at t if it satisfies:
ht(1) = g(t) (9.1)
ht(z) ≤ min{g(t′) : t′ ≈
I−(z)
t}. (9.2)
Next we define Algebraic Stability for g(t), using the notion of the Fourier transform of a
Boolean function (e.g. [O’D14]).
Definition 9.2 (Algebraic Stability). A function g(t) : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] is algebraically k-stable
if for every t ∈ [−1, 1]n there exists a Boolean extension ht(z) at t such that:
ĥt(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ [n] (9.3)
ĥt(S) = 0 for all S such that |S| > k, (9.4)
where ĥt(S) is the Fourier coefficient of ht at S ⊆ [n].
In the parlance of Boolean function analysis, g is algebraically stable if for all t, the Fourier
spectrum of ht is both nonnegative and low-degree. We prove the following analogue of Theorem 2.5.
Theorem 9.3. Let g : [−1, 1]n → [−1, 1] be algebraically k-stable and c-Lipschitz in L∞, let A be
an n×m matrix with entries in [−1, 1], let δ, ǫ > 0, and let s > 1
δ2
· log 2kǫ be an integer.
Fix a vector x ∈ ∆m, and let the random variable x˜ denote the empirical distribution of s i.i.d.
samples from probability distribution x. The following then holds:
E
x˜
[g(Ax˜)] ≥ g(Ax) − ǫ− cδ, (9.5)
Proof sketch. Let t = Ax. Consider the random variable t˜ = Ax˜ where x˜ is the (random) empirical
distribution. Let Ei denote the event that |t˜i − ti| ≤ δ for some δ ∈ (0, 1), i.e., that coordinate ti
is approximately preserved. Define a Boolean function pD : {−1, 1}n → [0, 1],
pD(z) := Pr
x˜
[(∩i∈I+(z)Ei) ∩ (∩i∈I−(z)Ei)]. (9.6)
In particular, pD(z) is the probability that only coordinates in I+(z) are approximately preserved.
It is easy to see that
∑
z∈{−1,1}n pD(z) = 1 and Pr[Ei] = Pr[|t˜i − t| ≤ δ] =
∑
z:zi=1
pD(z).
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Next, we state some standard equalities for Boolean functions. Let 1 denote the all-one n-
dimensional vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) and ht be a Boolean extension of gt as stated in Definition 9.2.∑
z∈{−1,1}n
ht(z) · pD(z) = 2n
∑
S⊆[n]
p̂D(S) · ĥt(S) (9.7)
∑
S⊆[n]
ĥt(S) = ht(1) (9.8)
By Definition 9.1, ht(1) = g(t). Since g(t) is c-Lipschitz in L
∞, we know:
E
x˜
[g(Ax˜)] = E
t˜
[g(t˜)] ≥
∑
z∈{−1,1}n
ht(z) · pD(z)− cδ, (9.9)
so it suffices to prove
∑
S⊆[n] ĥt(S)− 2n
∑
S⊆[n] p̂D(S) · ĥt(S) ≤ ǫ, which can be rewritten as:∑
S:|S|≤k
(1 − 2np̂D(S))ĥt(S) +
∑
S:|S|>k
(1− 2np̂D(S))ĥt(S) (9.10)
As the latter term in (9.10) is zero by definition 9.2, we only need to upper bound
∑
S:|S|≤k(1 −
2np̂D(S))ĥt(S). Using a simple union-bound argument, one can prove that with sample size s ≥
1
δ2
log 2kǫ , p̂D(S) ≥ 1−ǫ2n for all S ⊆ [n] with |S| ≤ k. As ĥt(S) ≥ 0 for S with |S| ≤ k, we
have
∑
S:|S|≤k(1 − 2np̂D(S))ĥt(S) ≤ ǫ
∑
S⊆[n] ĥt(S) ≤ ǫ. Combined with equation (9.9) we have
E[g(Ax˜)] ≥ g(t)− ǫ− cδ.
9.1 Algebraic Stability for our Applications
We observe that algebraic stability holds for the objective functions in some our applications,
and leave open whether it holds for all. Specifically, the relevant functions in lottery design,
revenue maximizing signaling, and one of our two voting problems, are algebraically O(1)-stable,
and therefore an additive PTAS for each of those applications follows from Theorem 9.3 just as it
did from Theorem 2.5. We list the Boolean extension associated with each of these applications.
Lemma 9.4 (Lottery design). For a fixed price p, a Boolean extension of the objective function
g
(lottery)
w,p (t) := p ·
∑n
i=1(wi · I[ti ≥ p]) at t is h(lottery)t (z) = p ·
∑
i∈[n]wi
zi+1
2 I[ti ≥ p]. We enumerate
over all prices p, up to a suitable discretization, in the algorithmic solution.
Lemma 9.5 (Persuasion in voting). A Boolean extension of g(vote-sum) at t is h
(vote-sum)
t (z) =∑
i∈[n]
I[ti≥0]
n
zi+1
2 .
Lemma 9.6 (Revenue maximization). A Boolean extension of the function max2 : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]
at t is h
(max2)
t (z) = tj
zi+1
2
zj+1
2 , where i and j denotes the indices of the largest and second-largest
entry of t, respectively.
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